In Smitherman v. Midland Credit Mgmt. Inc., the United States District Court for the Western Division of Missouri granted summary judgment for a creditor on a plaintiff’s claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., finding that the Plaintiff lacked standing to assert her claim and ruling that the creditor’s alleged conduct did not violate the FDCPA.
Factual Background
In January 2022, the creditor purchased three of the Plaintiff’s accounts, each having an outstanding debt. The creditor sent collection letters to the Plaintiff in January and February 2022. In mid-February 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel mailed three response letters, each stating, in part, that the Plaintiff “dispute[d] th[e] debt. Do not contact [Plaintiff] about th[e] debt. This is not a request for validation.” In turn, on February 24, 2023, the creditor mailed the Plaintiff three response letters that validated each account’s debt and stated that the creditor would not contact the Plaintiff about the accounts unless required by law or the Plaintiff requested communications. Notably, each of the creditor’s letters included a debt collection disclaimer.
On March 22, 2023, the Plaintiff mailed a single letter to the creditor wherein she ordered that the creditor cease all contact. The following day, she filed a single count FDCPA action against the creditor and alleged monetary damages for the cost of the stamp to mail the March 2023 letter as well as emotional distress damages.
The Court Rules in Favor of the Creditor
At the outset, the court found that the Plaintiff lacked standing on her FDCPA claim. The court reasoned that the Plaintiff’s mailing of the March 2023 letter was a poor attempt to “manufacture standing,” given the creditor’s February 24, 2023 letters that said it would cease contact with the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the court stated that the Plaintiff’s March 2023 letter to the creditor was “entirely unnecessary.” Further, the court held that the Plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress damages were insufficient to establish a concrete injury and did not amount to a “legally cognizable injury.” To read more click here.