The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a District Court’s decision granting summary judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case due to lack of standing to assert a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Case Background: The plaintiff’s landlord hired Hunter Warfield, Inc. (the Agency) to collect past-due rent. The Agency sent the plaintiff a letter with an initial offer of forgiving the debt in exchange for payment of roughly half of what she owed. The plaintiff alleged that this letter had several problems and that each of them violated the FDCPA. She alleged the letter (1) included utility fees that her landlord may have had no right to collect, (2) failed to put information about how to verify and dispute the debt on the front of the letter, and (3) warned of interest at the rate of 6.00%, which she alleged was too high.
As to injuries, the plaintiff alleged she suffered harms falling into four broad categories. First, she alleged procedural injuries: the violation of her federal statutory rights and an informational injury caused by the misleading statements. Next, she alleged future risk of tangible harm and emotional injuries, such as confusion, worry, and sleeplessness. Lastly, the plaintiff alleged out-of-pocket costs and the loss of time and money. She requested both damages and attorney fees.
Although the Agency’s answer mentioned standing as a defense, the District Court never addressed standing. Instead, it decided the case on the merits and granted summary judgment to the Agency on each of the plaintiff’s claims.
Court’s Analysis
The court begins by acknowledging their independent obligation to assure themselves of subject-matter jurisdiction. Here is where the court finds an issue. The court looked at the plaintiff’s complaint and noted that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the FDCPA violations occurred, the plaintiff still lacks standing. It discussed the requirement that a plaintiff must have suffered a concrete harm in addition to and because of the defendant’s violation of federal law. First, the court looked at the plaintiff’s purely informational injury and found that this harm is not concrete because the plaintiff has not identified any downstream consequence from failing to receive any information that may have been required by law.
As to the plaintiff’s risk of tangible harm, the court found this just as abstract, pointing out that the complaint never said what the risk was, much less whether it was imminent or substantial. As a result, the plaintiff’s “cryptic allegation about an ‘increased risk of harm’ is neither imminent nor concrete enough to count.”
Next, the court looked at the plaintiff’s alleged emotional injuries but found these still fell short. It noted they have previously concluded that being in a state of confusion is not itself an injury, and nervousness, restlessness, and irritability, amongst other negative emotions, are not either. While the plaintiff’s complaint substitutes some words, the court stated “the ‘negative emotions’ they describe are basically the same” and do not give rise to standing. It noted that even if emotional injuries counted, without supporting facts, they are just labels that fall short of plausibly establishing injury.
Lastly, the court looked at the plaintiff’s out-of-pocket costs and lost time and money and found these to be just as conclusory. It took issue with the complaint not telling anything about how the Agency’s actions financially harmed her. The court noted that the plaintiff did not identify any specific out-of-pocket expense that the letter caused her to incur.